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The Role of Emotion in Global Warming Policy Support
and Opposition
Nicholas Smith1,∗ and Anthony Leiserowitz2
Prior research has found that affect and affective imagery strongly influence public support
for global warming. This article extends this literature by exploring the separate influence of
discrete emotions. Utilizing a nationally representative survey in the United States, this study
found that discrete emotions were stronger predictors of global warming policy support than
cultural worldviews, negative affect, image associations, or sociodemographic variables. In
particular, worry, interest, and hope were strongly associated with increased policy support.
The results contribute to experiential theories of risk information processing and suggest that
discrete emotions play a significant role in public support for climate change policy. Implica-
tions for climate change communication are also discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Global warming is one of the world’s most
pressing problems. Unabated emissions of anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gases, primarily from the burn-
ing of fossil fuels, are likely to have irreversible
consequences.(1) Substantial reductions in these
emissions are therefore required if “dangerous” an-
thropogenic impacts are to be minimized, as rec-
ognized by international law.(2) Alongside tech-
nological advances and coordinated international
policies, the public will play an important role in
global emissions reductions through energy use, con-
sumer behavior, social norms, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, support for climate and energy policies.
Americans have been somewhat concerned
about global warming for many years,(3) although in
1Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University
College London, London, WC1H 0AP, UK.
2School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, CT 06511, USA.
∗Address correspondence to Nicholas Smith, Division of Psy-
chology and Language Sciences, University College Lon-
don, London, WC1H 0AP, UK; tel: +44 (0)207 679 5339;
nicholas.smith@ucl.ac.uk.
recent years, public concern about global warming
has decreased.(4–6) For example, in 2009 only 35% of
Americans considered global warming a very serious
problem compared to 44% in 2008.(4) In a series of
nationally representative surveys conducted between
2010 and 2012, Leiserowitz et al. found that fewer
than 12% of Americans said they were “very wor-
ried” about global warming, an overall drop of 5 per-
centage points or more since 2008.(7–9) A similar drop
in public opinion has also been identified in compa-
rable polls conducted internationally. Surveys con-
ducted in the United Kingdom, for example, found
that between 2005 and 2010, British public concern
about the issue dropped approximately 10 percent-
age points.(10–12) Several hypotheses have been pro-
posed to explain this period of increased scepticism,
including issue fatigue, the 2008 global financial cri-
sis, and decreased media attention (see Pidgeon(13)
and Brulle et al.(14) for reviews).
It is also important to situate these recent de-
clines in historical context. Ameta-analysis by Nisbet
andMyers(3) found that the proportion of Americans
indicating global warming is personally important to
them increased from 27% in 1997 to 52% in 2007.
Public concern, however, did not rise steadily, with
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world events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks tem-
porarily lowering levels of concern. They also found
that concern about global warming tends to be lower
than concern for other environmental issues (e.g.,
water and air pollution).
As a national priority, climate change has al-
ways been lower than other economic and social is-
sues. For example, in 2007, 68% of Americans said
that the economy should be a top priority for the
president and Congress compared to 38% who said
global warming should be a top priority.(15) Global
warming’s priority rating has also steadily declined
over the past five years with only 26% in 2011 and
25% in 2012 saying global warming should be a
top priority.(15) Despite this, public support for a
variety of national policies to reduce emissions re-
mains high. For example, since 2010, approximately
three-quarters of the American public has strongly
or somewhat supported policies to fund more renew-
able energy research and regulate carbon dioxide as
a pollutant.(16)
Researchers have investigated a range of factors
that influence public responses to risks and hazards.
The “risk as analysis” paradigm, for example, focuses
on the use of cognitive deliberation to assess risk.
Cognitive risk perception researchers have identified
a variety of heuristics and biases used to process and
understand risk information.(17–19) More recent re-
search, however, has focused on “risk as feelings,”
arguing that people often rely more on affect and
emotion than cognition when making risk judgments
and decisions.(20–22) Affect is processed quickly, auto-
matically, and efficiently and enables people to make
daily decisions with relatively little cognitive effort
and studies have found that an “affect heuristic” is
strongly associated with risk perceptions and policy
support for a range of risk issues, including global
warming.(23–26)
Slovic and Peters(21) describe affect (feelings
of good or bad) as a “faint whisper of emotion”
(p. 322), but do discrete emotions also influence how
people respond to global warming? If so, which emo-
tions? Do they increase or decrease public support
for climate-related policies? How well do discrete
emotions predict public policy support compared to
other known drivers such as affect, imagery, values,
and demographic and political variables? Below, we
review relevant research. To start, we consider how
emotion is defined then review the existing research
literature on the links between emotion and risk per-
ception, positive emotions and attitudes, and emo-
tions and policy support.
Researchers have investigated the content and
function of emotion for many years. As such, the
field has well-established definitions and conceptual-
izations of emotion.(27–29) A comprehensive overview
is beyond the scope of this article, but it is impor-
tant to distinguish how discrete emotions differ from
affect and what this distinction might offer to the
study of how people process and make judgments
about risk. Forgas(30) defines emotions as “intense
and short-lived” with a “definite cause and clear cog-
nitive content” (p. 230). Affect, however, refers to
a more general positive (good) or negative (bad)
feeling.(31) Emotions are often both more complex
and less subtle. Anger and fear, for example, might
evoke similar levels of negative affect, but are distinct
emotions with separate causes, physiological expres-
sion, and cognitive content.(28,32)
Other research has examined the role of discrete
emotions in risk perception. Sjoberg,(33) for exam-
ple, provided evidence that fear, anger, and worry in-
fluence public risk perceptions of mobile telephone
use, genetically modified foods, and terrorism. Fear
and anger have also been found to play an impor-
tant role in risk perceptions of radiation sources,(34)
whereas disgust has been found to predict risk per-
ceptions of food safety.(35) Finucane(22) argues that
negative emotions are important determinants of risk
perception because they motivate deeper informa-
tion processing. Discussing mood, Schwarz et al.(36)
also argue that people process information more
carefully and deliberately when negative moods are
evoked. Using controlled experiments and drawing
on models of persuasion (elaboration likelihood(37)
and heuristic systematic models(38)), Meijnders
et al.(29) examined the interactions between emotions
and argument strength and found that greater fear of
climate change was associated with greater system-
atic processing of information about energy-related
behaviors.
Beyond the powerful influence of negative emo-
tions, however, positive emotions can also have im-
portant effects. Sjoberg(33) found that positive emo-
tions, including interest, satisfaction, and optimism,
were stronger positive predictors of attitudes toward
nuclear waste repositories than negative emotions.
Interest also accounted for a significant proportion of
variance in attitude toward a variety of other risk is-
sues, including “mad cow” disease, background radi-
ation, and high-voltage power lines. Sjoberg argued
that even though risks are perceived as threaten-
ing, people are often also motivated to feel hopeful
and interested in options to mitigate the threat. In
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another study, Hoijer(39) examined how the Swedish
media communicated emotions in the social con-
struction of global warming risk and found that hope
and compassion were used as emotional anchors to
help people understand projected climate impacts.
These results suggest that many people do not view
hazards merely as something to avoid. On the con-
trary, interest and hope may motivate people to learn
more about the hazard and to take or support mitiga-
tion or adaptation measures.
There has been less research, however, on the
influence of discrete emotions on policy support. A
few researchers have explored the differential influ-
ence of fear and anger on policy preferences. For ex-
ample, anger has been found to be strongly associ-
ated with support for vengeful or retribution-focused
policy initiatives. Lerner et al.(32) explored the effects
fear and anger have on terrorism policy preferences
and found that anger was more strongly associated
with support for deportation policies than fear. Sim-
ilarly, Nabi(40) found that anger was more strongly
associated with retributive drunk-driving policies.
Even fewer studies, however, have explored the role
of positive emotions on policy support. Truelove(41)
found that positive affect and discrete emotions were
more strongly associated with support for wind en-
ergy than for coal or nuclear power. However, as far
as we are aware, no studies have investigated the re-
lationship of discrete emotions and global warming
policy preferences. Rather than testing specific hy-
potheses, this exploratory study investigated whether
different discrete emotions predict public support or
opposition to global warming policies.
2. METHOD
2.1. Respondents and Procedure
A nationally representative survey of American
global warming knowledge, risk perceptions, policy
preferences, and behavior was conducted from late
December 2009 to early January 2010, using the
online, probability-based panel of Knowledge Net-
works.3 The survey had 1,001 adult respondents, with
a 53% within-panel completion rate. The data were
subsequently weighted to match U.S. Census Cur-
rent Population Survey estimates of national demo-
graphic parameters, including gender, age, race, eth-
nicity, education, census region, and income. The
3Knowledge Networks provides panel members without a com-
puter or Internet connection each of these services.
margin of sampling error was plus or minus 3%, with
95% confidence.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Policy Preferences
Respondents were asked to indicate their sup-
port for or opposition to a variety of different poli-
cies to mitigate global warming. Policies included re-
search on renewable energy sources, the regulation
of carbon dioxide as a pollutant, 25 cents per gal-
lon increase in the gasoline tax, and establishment of
a fund to make buildings more energy efficient. For
analysis, a policy support index was created based on
the overall mean response for each policy item (α =
0.90; see Table I for full questions).
2.2.2. Holistic Affect
Respondents were asked to rate whether global
warming is a good or a bad thing using a unipolar, six-
point Likert scale ranging between + 3 (very good)
and –3 (very bad).
2.2.3. Affective Imagery
Affective images4 were collected from all re-
spondents and contain two elements: a cognitive
component (the image category) and an associated
affective rating (a goodness or badness evaluation).
Images were collected using an open-ended word
association methodology(44,45) that enables context-
free associations to emerge naturalistically. Images
were collected by asking respondents to provide the
first “word” or “phrase” that comes to mind when
thinking about global warming. Responses took the
form of single-word associations (e.g., “apocalypse”)
or short narrative statements (e.g., “the end of the
world”). Once collected, respondents were asked to
provide an affective rating for the images they had
provided using a six-point scale (where +3 = “a very
good thing” and –3= “a very bad thing”). This proce-
dure produced a rich data set of images that were an-
alyzed using a deductive content analysis procedure
developed in earlier national studies.(46,24) A total
4“Imagery” refers to mental representations or cognitive content
within the individual mind and can include both perceptual and
symbolic representations.(42) “Affective imagery” is therefore de-
fined as “sights, sounds, smells, ideas, and words, to which posi-
tive and negative affect or feeling states have become attached
through learning and experience” (p. 3).(43)
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Table I. Policy Support Index
Alpha If Item
Mean SD Deleted Alpha
Policy Support Index 2.61 0.70 0.90
Fund more research into renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power 3.22 0.80 0.90
Provide tax rebates for people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles or solar
panels
3.07 0.84 0.89
Regulate carbon dioxide 2.81 0.97 0.88
Sign an international treaty to cut emissions 2.59 0.98 0.88
Require electric utilities to produce at least 20% of their electricity renewables 2.55 1.01 0.88
Cap and trade 2.46 0.89 0.89
Establish a special fund to help make buildings more energy efficient 2.47 1.00 0.88
Provide financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to
limit their greenhouse gas emissions
2.37 0.97 0.88
Increase taxes on gasoline 2.09 0.96 0.90
Note: n = 974. Scales range from 1 (strongly oppose) to 4 (strongly support).
of 24 image categories were coded, but the top nine
categories accounted for the majority of responses.
These categories were not mutually exclusive, for ex-
ample, a respondent associating global warming with
“polar bears dying as sea ice melts” could be coded as
both “nature” and “icemelt.” Ten percent of images
were also double coded to ensure reliability of the
coding frame and interreliability achieved satisfac-
tory significance (80%). Discrepancies were resolved
following discussion between coders. The mean af-
fect of each image category was also calculated.
2.2.4. Values
The cultural worldviews of egalitarianism and in-
dividualism were operationalized using a series of
questions derived from cultural theory and from
scales used by Dake,(47,48) Peters and Slovic,(45)
Rippl,(49) and Leiserowitz.(24) For analysis, egalitar-
ianism and individualism indices were created, each
with a high reliability score (α = 0.78 and 0.85, re-
spectively; see Table II for full questions).
2.2.5. Emotions
Respondents were asked to rate the intensity of
different emotions felt when thinking about global
warming. The emotions assessed were derived from
commonly used lists of primary and secondary dis-
crete emotions(50) and included fear, helplessness, in-
terest,5 anger, sadness, hope, depression, guilt, dis-
gust, and worry. Respondents were asked: “How
5Interest has been categorized as an “eccentric” emotion but one
that has a stable pattern of underlying cognitive appraisal.(51)
strongly do you feel each of the following emotions
when you think about the issue of global warming?”
Responses were recorded using a 1–4 scale, where 1
= not at all and 4 = very strongly.
2.2.6. Sociodemographics
A range of sociodemographic information was
also collected, including sex, age, race/ethnicity,
educational attainment, political ideology (liberal–
conservative), political party identification (Demo-
crat, independent, Republican), religiosity (fre-
quency of religious service attendance), and
household income.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Policy Preferences
Respondents were asked how much they sup-
ported or opposed a range of different climate and
energy-related policies (Fig. 1). Overall, respondents
most strongly supported policies associated with re-
newable energy. Eighty-five percent supported fund-
ing more research into renewable energy sources in-
cluding wind and solar power and 82% supported a
policy to provide tax rebates for individuals who pur-
chase energy-efficient vehicles or solar panels. Large
majorities of respondents also supported the regula-
tion of carbon dioxide as a pollutant (71%) and the
signing of an international treaty to cut carbon diox-
ide emissions 90% by 2050 (61%). Fifty-eight per-
cent supported cap and trade legislation to control
the production of greenhouse gas emissions, but only
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Table II. Egalitarianism and Individualism Indices
Mean SD Alpha If Item Deleted Alpha
Egalitarianism Index (n = 928) 2.52 0.76 0.78
The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were
divided more equally among nations.
2.29 0.99 0.73
In my ideal society, all basic needs (food, housing, healthcare,
education) would be guaranteed by the government for
everyone.
2.33 1.06 0.71
I support government programs to get rid of poverty. 2.73 0.92 0.73
Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in
our society.
2.70 0.95 0.74
Individualism Index (n = 934) 2.77 0.73 0.85
If the government spent less time trying to fix everyone’s
problems, we would all be a lot better off.
2.87 0.92 0.82
Our government tries to do too many things for too many people.
We should just let people take care of themselves.
2.66 0.94 0.81
The government interferes too much in our everyday lives. 2.89 0.90 0.82
Government regulation of business usually does more harm than
good.
2.77 0.86 0.82
People should be allowed to make as much money as they can,
even if it means some make millions while others live in
poverty.
2.66 0.95 0.85
Note: Scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
Fig. 1. Support for policy option.
when this policy was explained.6 A policy to increase
gasoline taxes by 25 cents per gallon received the
least public support (34%).
6A definition of cap and trade was provided to all respondents be-
fore they were asked about their support or opposition for the
policy.
3.2. Emotional Responses to Global Warming
Respondents felt a variety of emotions when
thinking about the issue of global warming (Fig. 2).
Sixty-five percent said they felt moderately or very
interested in global warming. Approximately half
felt disgusted (52%), worried (50%), hopeful (46%),
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Fig. 2. Emotions felt very or moderately in relation to global warming.
helpless (45%), angry (44%), or sad (43%) about the
issue. Roughly, a third said they felt afraid (36%),
whereas a quarter felt either depressed (26%) or
guilty (25%).
3.3. The Influence of Emotions on Policy Support
Initially, a series of bivariate correlations were
conducted to explore associations between the
emotion variables and holistic affect (Table III).
Some relatively high correlations were reported but
multicollinearity statistics (tolerance and variance
inflation factor (VIF)) were acceptable. A multiple
regression model was then constructed, using the
“enter” method, to explore the individual and com-
bined association of holistic affect, affective imagery,
values, discrete emotions, and sociodemographics
variables with global warming policy preferences
(Table IV). Only the items significant in separate
linear regressions were entered into each model.
The sample size of each regression analysis was also
kept constant to enable comparison between models
(n = 837). This sample size reflects the total number
of participants for which there were no missing
values in the full models of each regression analysis.
3.3.1. Global Warming Policy Support
Model 1: Affect found that holistic affect was
a significant predictor and explained 28% of the
variance in policy support (F (1, 835) = 330.60, p
< 0.001, Adj. R2 = 0.28). The more negative re-
spondents felt global warming to be the more likely
they were to support a range of climate and energy-
related policies. Model 2: Images found that several
affective images were significantly associated with
policy support or opposition and explained 33% of
the variance (F (10, 826) = 41.47, p< 0.001, Adj.
R2 = 0.33). Respondents, who provided naysayer,
don’t know, and politics-related images were more
likely to oppose national policies, whereas those
who provided icemelt and flooding/sea level rise im-
ages were more likely to support national policies.
Model 3: Values found that egalitarian and individ-
ualistic values were significantly associated with pol-
icy support and opposition and explained 37% of the
variance (F (2, 834) = 240.83, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 =
0.37). Egalitarians were more likely to support poli-
cies, whereas individualists were more likely to op-
pose them.
Model 4: Emotions explained 50% of the vari-
ance (F (12, 824) = 70.23, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 = 0.50).
Worry about global warming was the strongest pos-
itive predictor of support for national policies, fol-
lowed by hope and interest. Guilt was also weakly as-
sociated with policy support. Disgust was associated
with opposition to climate and energy policies, likely
reflecting the emotional response of the respondents
most dismissive of the issue. The interaction be-
tween worry and disgust was also weakly positively
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Table III. Correlation Matrix
Holistic Affect Worry Afraid Helpless Interested Angry Sad Hopeful Depressed Guilty
Worry 0.65**
Afraid 0.43** 0.67**
Helpless 0.37** 0.50** 0.64**
Interested 0.32** 0.50** 0.57** 0.54**
Angry 0.24** 0.41** 0.57** 0.48** 0.53**
Sad 0.44** 0.59** 0.70** 0.58** 0.57** 0.68**
Hopeful 0.24** 0.35** 0.36** 0.43** 0.64** 0.32** 0.38**
Depressed 0.37** 0.55** 0.68** 0.57** 0.47** 0.57** 0.66** 0.27**
Guilty 0.34** 0.54** 0.65** 0.51** 0.43** 0.41** 0.56** 0.35** 0.59**
Disgusted 0.21** 0.40** 0.54** 0.52** 0.52** 0.78** 0.64** 0.26** 0.57** 0.40**
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
associated with policy support, indicating that the re-
spondents most worried and disgusted about global
warming were more likely to support national poli-
cies.7 Model 5: Sociodemographics explained 23% of
the variance (F (5, 831) = 50.31, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 =
0.23) in climate change policy support. Political ide-
ology was the strongest predictor, with political lib-
erals more likely to support climate policies and con-
servatives more likely to oppose them. Democrats
were also more likely to support policies, whereas
Republicans were not. Finally, nonwhite Americans
were slightly more likely to support global warming
policies.
In Model 6: Full all variables were entered to
identify the strongest predictors of climate change
policy support and opposition. The full model ex-
plained 59% of the variance (F (30, 806) = 41.57, p <
0.001, Adj. R2 = 0.59) in policy support. Worry was
the strongest predictor followed by egalitarianism,
that is, respondents who worried about global warm-
ing or who held an egalitarian worldview were more
likely to support climate policies. Interest, hope, and
negative holistic affect were also each strongly associ-
ated with support for national policies. Individualism
was the strongest predictor of policy opposition, fol-
lowed by naysayer and politics imagery. That is, re-
spondents who held an individualistic worldview and
who provided skeptical and political associations to
global warming were more likely to oppose national
policies.
7Exploratory tree analysis in SPSS identified several interactions
to explore: worry × disgust, worry × afraid, worry × interest,
worry × guilt, and worry × hope. However, separate linear re-
gressions with policy support identified that only worry × disgust
and worry × hope were significant and therefore only these were
included in the multiple regressions.
4. DISCUSSION
This investigation explores the role discrete emo-
tions play in public climate change policy pref-
erences. Previous research has documented the
important role of affect as a subtle form of
emotion,(23,46,24,52) but fewer studies have explored
the role discrete emotions play in policy support. This
research found that discrete emotions alone were
able to explain a large proportion of the variance
(50%) in public global warming policy support. Fur-
ther, discrete emotions were the strongest predictors
of policy support, even controlling for other factors
like holistic affect, imagery, values, sociodemograph-
ics, political party, and ideology.
Worry, in particular, was the single strongest
predictor. That is, the more respondents worried
about global warming, the more likely they were to
support national climate and energy policies. Inter-
estingly, however, fear was not associated with in-
creased policy support in either the emotion block
or the full model. Although a positive correlation
was found between worry and fear in initial bivari-
ate correlation analyses, the relative impact of fear
was “washed out” when combined with other items
in both of these models. This finding has important
implications for climate change educators and com-
municators. Fear appeals have often been used under
the assumption that scaring the public about climate
change will engage them in the issue, motivate indi-
vidual action, and generate public support for broad
policy change, but recent research demonstrates that
fear appeals are often ineffective or even counter-
productive. “Dire” fear-based messaging around ex-
treme weather and other climate phenomena(39,53)
has been found to raise anxieties, but also to dis-
tance the public.(54) O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole(55)
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Table IV. Multiple Regressions on Policy Preferences
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent Variables Affect Images Values Emotions Sociodemographics Full
Holistic affect 0.53*** 0.10**
Alarmists 0.03 –0.05*
Naysayers –0.46*** –0.08**
Ozone 0.03 0.03
Do not know –0.09** –0.03
Icemelt 0.13*** 0.07**
Pollution 0.05 0.01
Flood/sea level 0.09** 0.02
Politics –0.18*** –0.06**
Dry/desert 0.05 0.02
Greenhouse 0.05 0.00
Egalitarianism 0.37*** 0.18***
Individualism –0.36*** –0.12***
Afraid –0.03 –0.01
Helpless –0.02 –0.05
Interested 0.12*** 0.12**
Angry –0.04 –0.01
Sad 0.04 –0.05
Hopeful 0.19*** 0.16***
Depressed 0.06 0.07*
Guilty 0.10** 0.06*
Disgusted –0.12** –0.04
Worry 0.49*** 0.25***
Worry*Hope –0.03 0.00
Worry*Disgust 0.09** 0.07**
Party identification 0.18*** 0.00
Political ideology 0.35*** 0.05
Religiosity 0.00 0.01
Gender 0.05 0.00
Race/ethnicity –0.06* –0.04
F 330.60*** 41.47*** 240.83*** 70.23*** 50.31*** 41.57***
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.50 0.23 0.59
N 837 837 837 837 837 837
Note: Dependent variable: Policy support index. Entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas).
*Significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01; ***significant at 0.001.
found that catastrophic and alarmist visual imagery
actually decreased public engagement with the issue.
When frightened about a threat that seems individ-
ually uncontrollable, many individuals purposively
disengage, via psychological distancing, as a form of
emotion-focused coping.(56) Fear appeals have also
been tested by health communication researchers,
who have also found that they can be counterpro-
ductive, especially in the absence of messages that
increase perceived self-efficacy.(57)
Moser(58) argues that fear can cause attitude and
behavioral change but only in situations where the
individuals feel personally “at risk,” among other
factors. The limited success of global warming fear
appeals may also be attributable to a feeling of per-
sonal invulnerability combined with the belief that
individual or collective action either is too difficult
or would not make a difference. As many Americans
view climate change as a relatively abstract and dis-
tant threat,(46,59) the challenge for climate communi-
cators is to increase both the sense of threat while
also increasing the sense of personal and collective
efficacy.
By contrast, worry was the strongest predic-
tor of public support for global warming policies,
suggesting that perhaps “worry appeals” should be
a focus for risk communicators. “Worry appeals”
might promote a more sustainable and constructive
emotional engagement with the issue of global warm-
ing. By contrast, fear is an intense emotion typically
experienced in response to a perceived immediate
threat and primes the body for immediate action,
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including the fight or flight reflex.(60) Similarly, in-
tense fear can cause an “amygdala hijack,” re-
ducing cognitive and analytical processing of risk
information.(61) Climate change, however, is a long-
term incremental threat that will manifest over
decades and a prototypical example of a “hidden
hazard”—“risks that despite potentially serious con-
sequences for society, generally pass unheeded until
they reach disaster proportions,”(62) p. 251.(62,63) In
fact, this and prior studies have documented that cli-
mate change is often perceived as a threat distant in
time and space by many members of the public,(46,64)
exactly the kind of hazard that is less likely to
activate a full-blown fear response. In addition, fear-
based communications tend to emphasize apocalyp-
tic, worst-case scenarios, which in turn can cause is-
sue avoidance or even hostile backlash among some
audiences, leading them to disengage, doubt, or dis-
miss the issue.(65,66)
We suggest, however, that worry is a less in-
tense emotion better suited to the issue of climate
change. Worry tends to motivate, not short-circuit,
more intense cognitive and analytical processing of
risk information. People often worry about their ca-
reers, health, retirement, the state of the economy,
or their children’s future, leading them to seek out
additional information about the risks as well as
potential actions to reduce risk. Higher levels of
worry about cancer, for example, have been found
to predict greater attention to cancer-based health
information(67) and interest in genetic testing and be-
liefs about its benefit.(68) Although people appear to
have a “finite pool of worry,”(69) “worry appeals”
could prove more effective than “fear appeals” as
a means to motivate constructive engagement with
climate change. Worry can motivate and promote
processes of problem identification, analysis, option
seeking, deliberative decision making, implementa-
tion, evaluation, and recalibration—in short, the kind
of deliberative and iterative decision making climate
change requires.(62) Worry can also, under certain
circumstances, be useful for developing strategies to
cope with or have control over stressful events, par-
ticularly in situations with a high degree of perceived
personal investment.(70) Extreme levels of worry,
however, can become debilitating,(71,72) so “worry ap-
peals” would still need to be carefully calibrated to be
neither too mild nor too intense.
This study also found that positive emotions ap-
pear to play an important role in public support
for climate policies. Interest and hope were strongly
associated with greater policy support. Similarly,
Sjoberg(33) reported strong associations between in-
terest and demand for risk mitigation across a va-
riety of hazards, and Simons et al.(73) found that
hope played a key role in public responses to nan-
otechnology, including expectations about its po-
tential benefits. Meneses(74) argues that campaigns
should use positive rather than negative rhetoric to
promote recycling behavior, as the act of recycling
and other pro-environmental behavior is often as-
sociated with positive emotions. Feeling good about
doing the “right thing” can be an important mo-
tivator of behavior change.(75,76) Arguably, interest
increases issue salience, information seeking, and
learning, whereas the lack of interest leads to pub-
lic disengagement or apathy. Similarly, hope aligned
with personal or collective efficacy supports individ-
ual and collective action.(77)
In an experimental study, Myers et al.(78) pre-
sented subjects with climate change information us-
ing one of three frames (health, national security,
and environmental) and assessed their hope versus
anger-based emotional reactions. They found that
presenting global warming as a health issue was
more likely to promote feelings of hope than ei-
ther the national security or environmental frames.
Promoting feelings of hope about mitigation policies
that also benefit human health could be an effective
means of communicating climate change to both en-
gaged and disengaged audiences. Such a “gain frame
advantage”(79) has been found to promote more pos-
itive attitudes toward climate change mitigation than
information focused on losses, or costs of inaction.
Elaboration likelihood models of persuasion(37)
also suggest that positive rather than negative emo-
tions are more persuasive and likely to sustain endur-
ing attitudes over time for issues of low involvement,
that is, for issues where people do not see them-
selves personally “at risk” or vulnerable.(80) Given
the general lack of public involvement with the issue
of climate change, combined with the relationship
between hope, interest, and policy support found in
this investigation, developing communications that
increase public interest, inspire hope, and encourage
positive feelings when people act in climate-friendly
ways may be more effective than fear or guilt ap-
peals. This study also found that manyAmericans are
interested in the issue and hopeful about policies to
mitigate the risk. As a consequence, climate change
communicators should also consider using “interest
appeals” and “hope appeals” to promote construc-
tive engagement with climate change solutions.
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Finally, this study also found that discrete emo-
tions explained more variance than either negative
affect or cultural worldviews. Although previous re-
search has documented the important role of affect
and worldviews in global warming policy support,(24)
discrete emotions were the most powerful variables
in this study. These findings thus support the “risk as
feelings” hypothesis that experiential factors, includ-
ing affect and discrete emotions, play a critical role in
the processing of risk information.(20,26)
As an exploratory study, a limitation is the cor-
relational nature of the research findings. Due to the
cross-sectional nature of the survey data, we cannot
determine the causal relationship between variables,
although it is unlikely, for example, that greater sup-
port for climate policies leads to increased levels of
worry about climate change. This study also did not
assess trait emotions, that is, dispositional emotions
such as the tendency for some people to worry, be
fearful, or be hopeful more than others, as opposed
to specific levels of worry, fear, or hope about cli-
mate change. The emotion measures in this study
were also based on respondents’ self-reported assess-
ments of their emotional reactions, not direct physi-
ological measures. Further research will be required
to determine the specific relationships between each
emotion and policy support. Further research will
also be required to more fully understand different
emotional responses to different aspects of global
warming. Each of the causes, consequences, and so-
lutions to climate change may evoke different emo-
tional responses among different people.(23) For ex-
ample, windmills clearly activate different emotions
and interpretations in different members of the pub-
lic. The relative influence of positive versus nega-
tive emotions on public responses to global warm-
ing will be especially important to explore in this
regard. For example, it will be interesting for fur-
ther research to investigate when and to what extent
positive emotions associated with potential solutions
to global warming might matter more than negative
emotions associated with the impacts. The present
analysis, however, is an initial exploration of the va-
riety of discrete emotions Americans associate with
the issue of global warming in general—an important
level of analysis in its own right as “global warming,”
as a holistic term, is frequently used in public and pol-
icy discourse.
In summary, this research found that discrete
emotions—especially worry, interest, and hope—
appear to have a large influence onAmerican climate
change policy preferences. The challenge for commu-
nication strategists is how best to cue these powerful
motivations to promote public engagement with cli-
mate change solutions.
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